"the God spot," "the God gene," and "Darwin's God." People from a variety of religious perspectives, from Western Buddhists to evangelicals to the anti-religious, have practiced and discussed this body of research, each bringing to it their sometimes contradictory assumptions and interpretations. Biologizing religion is a research project, but it is also a public desire trying to satisfy itself, trying to breed consequence.
So what happens to religion when it is biologized? Many would intuitively believe philosopher and "New Atheist" Daniel Dennett, whose bestselling Breaking the Spell (2006) frames biologizing religiosity and overcoming it as two sides of the same coin; each leads to the other. Confident in the possibility of a biological account, Dennett contends that "we" should "gently, firmly educate the people of the world, so that they can make truly informed choices about their lives" (339), choices which (if the science is done right) he clearly believes will involve dispelling religion. Less optimistically but along similar lines, cognitive anthropologist Scott Atran suspects that "religious belief in the supernatural will be here to stay" only despite those who come to understand it scientifically (2002: 280) . Meanwhile, other biologizers prefer to maintain agnosticism toward religious politics, apparently pursuing a scientific study of religion apart from biases and agendas. Scientific methods, they assume, offer to liberate research from ideological and theological debates.
With a broad survey of recent biologizers of religion, I point to the limits of both determinism and agnosticism, arguing that the lines between religion and the scientific study of it are not so clear. Biologizers depend on traditional ways of conceptualizing religiosity that have particular ideological connotations. In turn, self-described religionists are eager to respond creatively to scientific research, and in some cases they themselves have begun biologizing in order to shed new light on their own religiosities. As a historical discussion will show, this should not be surprising. The concepts and practices of science and religiosity have not been static absolutes but are constructed variously, often in terms of one another. For all that scientific methods may offer the study of religion, they are not necessarily an escape from the influence of the theologies and ideologies that have long accompanied it.
The consequences of biologizing are more complex and difficult to predict than any one interpreter has yet been willing to admit. The assumption of Dennet and Atran that a scientific description of religiosity counteracts it, in turn, rests on a simplistic model of static identity and conflict between science and religion that has been amply refuted by modern experience. Instead, biologizing is a new move in the ongoing transformations that people have called religion or science, subject to such biases, imagination, and missteps that have always accompanied these undertakings. Following Thomas Kuhn (1962) , my recognition that science is a human construction should not be taken to undermine its provisional value. Here, I treat biologizing as, on the one hand, a series of new directions for serious research, and on the other, a movement with religious vitality of its own.
Biologizing Religion
The work I review in the following pages covers what I take to be some of the highlights of recent biologized religion so far. These authors call themselves by a handful of names and are affiliated with a number of different disciplines. I account for them in three categoriescognitivists, neurotheologians, and evolutionary biologists-based on the communities they have formed and the methods they rely on. My inevitable picking and choosing emphasizes those whose work has been most cited, as well as those who have taken the lead in interpreting it in the popular press. At this early stage, it is important to be at least as attentive to these interpretations as to the empirical work itself, not least because they will shape the motives and methods of future researchers.
As in any previous attempts to take account of religion, biologizers define their object of study in a number of ways. Because the concept of religion arises out of particular historical contexts, and because it is often so politically contested within them, any attempt to define it will be a value-laden exercise. Throughout these pages, I will draw attention to the conceptual lineages that researchers, consciously or not, draw from in so doing. I will point to their use of three traditional approaches: Humean (religion as beliefs), Jamesian (religion as experiences), and Durkheimian (religion as collectivity). Though each of the three represents a distinct emphasis, they emerged in conversation with one another and overlap. Each approach, in turn, shares roots and resemblances with certain theological and philosophical traditions, whose relevance should become apparent later on. As well as offering a definition of religion, each approach posits the role of science in elucidating it. While some biologizers do their work on religion in thoroughly professional contexts, others tend to be professional researchers whose ideas on religion appear to be more of a hobby -published in the popular press apart from peer-reviewed publications, by and large lacking scholarly sophistication. This fact marks a crucial distinction between those who have prioritized the effort to build a robust, self-critical community of researchers and those who prefer to make ambitious proclamations in the popular press. Effective natural science depends on a sociology of knowledge in which the pressure to produce repeatable, falsifiable, and empirical claims hedges against the bias of individuals. Evaluating the biologizers therefore means looking not just at their findings and interpretations, but also at the peer communities they are either creating or neglecting.
My summary begins with the scientific frameworks under which biologizers are working (along with the performative powers these frameworks wield), followed by the meanings and interpretations these researchers have attributed to their findings.
Cognitivists
Many of the most sophisticated biologizers today fall under the "cognitivist" label, bringing a half-century of experience in cognitive science to bear on religiosity. These tend to be anthropologists, psychologists, and religious studies scholars publishing in peer-reviewed journals and in books with university presses. As a community, they are working to build a comprehensive explanation of religiosity-including beliefs and practices-in terms of universal mechanisms in the human mind. Conceptually, they draw most heavily on the Humean approach by thinking of religion as emerging from the natural plausibility of certain kinds of beliefs in individual human minds. Those who deal principally with ritual, however, might tend also toward the collectivity-centered Durkheimian approach.
The general field of cognitive science emerged in the context of artificial intelligence research with computers after World War II. "The last 30 years of cognitive science," notes one observer, "can be seen as attempts to remake the person in the image of the computer" (Hutchins 1996: 363) . In that same period, of course, computers have become ever more powerful and ever more woven into everyday modern life. Though the visions of the early artifical intelligence theorists have not quite come to be, we increasingly encounter computers in tasks where there once were humans, including security, customer service, manufacturing, design, and financial planning. As living becomes comprehensible in terms of interaction with intelligent computers, describing our species and its capabilities in computational terms seems possible as well.
Through the metaphor of the computer, a machine that people can build from bottom up and understand, human intelligence begins to appear explainable in terms of its biological "hardware" or "wiring" running the learned "software" of experience-biologizing then becomes a matter of computerizing. This paradigm's growth was fueled by the theory of generative grammar proposed by Noam Chomsky in the 1950s, which convinced many that mental processes can be usefully described in terms of computation. Coupled with the success of Chomsky's project, cognitive science represented a departure from the then-dominant behaviorist mode of psychology, which refused to explicate the internal logic of mental processes and looked only at how various influences condition behavior. Since then, researchers from a number of disciplines including linguistics, philosophy, and psychology have allied themselves with cognitive science, rejecting the limits behaviorist thinking imposed. Though it can trace its roots to the sociobiology controversy of the 1970s (Wilson 1975) , the related field of evolutionary psychology began in earnest with Jerome Barkow, Leda Cosmides, and John Tooby's influential
The Adapted Mind (1992) . Habitually citing the significance of Chomsky (despite his skepticism for their approach), evolutionary psychologists add Darwinian reasoning to cognitive science and postulate that "the mind is a set of information-processing machines that were designed by natural selection to solve adaptive problems faced by our hunter-gatherer ancestors" (Cosmides and Tooby 1997) . The evolutionary perspective is an indispensable ingredient to emerging cognitivist accounts of religion.
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, a theoretical and experimental framework for a cognitive study of religious belief began to emerge. (Boyer 1994; Barrett and Keil [1996] 2006).
By evaluating how test subjects in a variety of cultural contexts intuitively described narratives about supernatural action, for instance, Barrett claims to elucidate the cognitive processes beneath, and sometimes opposed to, the formal theological formulations of religious beliefs.
Based on a series of experiments conducted in several different cultural contexts, Barrett and Boyer argue that the "minimally counter-intuitive (MCI)" nature of virtually all "folk" supernatural beliefs (e.g., God as basically a person who happens to be all-powerful) makes them optimally memorable and therefore likely to be transmitted. The "folk" for cognitive anthropologists is an idealized naive human self embodied in biological limits that we all fundamentally experience, an only partly accurate perceiver of the world. With a decidedly Humean approach, these researchers set out to explain in scientific terms why such "counterintuitive" beliefs take hold of human minds. With a theory of memes-units of culture that perpetuate themselves among minds just as genes do among bodies-many cognitivists give religious beliefs an agency of their own, casting them as living parasites (Boyer 2001: 34; Atran 2002: 236; Dennett 2006: 78 (Henig 2007) . The cognitivists represent a growing paradigm in the study of religion, complete with internal debates, a growing public following, and graduate students.
Neurotheologians
While cognitive science treats the brain as a computer to be studied through inputs and outputs, neuroscientists, and consequently "neurotheologians," 4 examine the inner workings of the brain as an organ using sophisticated imaging technology. For the most part, they are strictly Jamesians, looking to understand religiosity by turning scientific methods on peak experiences, which the subjects and researchers usually both agree to think of as religious. They disagree on what William James called "the too simple-minded system" of "medical materialism," which "finishes up Saint Paul by calling his vision on the road to Damascus a discharging lesion of the occipital cortex, he being an epileptic" (James [1902 (James [ ] 1929 . While all neurotheologians are interested in correlating peak, individualized experiences to known biological processes, many want to retain metaphysical, rather than medical, explanations for them. Others assert 11 materialistic reductionism just as James described it. Some neurotheologians suggest that the very concept of religion (or "spirituality") may actually have a direct biological basis.
In recent decades, brain science has had a growing impact on ordinary life in industrialized societies, and this impact has generated considerable explanatory currency.
Nonscientist Matthew Alper, whose personal quest in The "God" Part of the Brain has become a cult classic, tells of his own conversion story to science after being prescribed psychiatric drugs:
"Whereas in the past, however, in which I had admired the sciences, I now revered them. Science had saved my life. I was indebted to it. God didn't save me. I didn't save me. ... And so, the same faith that many placed in a god or religion, I now placed in science" ([1996] 2006: 11). It was this experience that turned Alper from seeking God through religions to probing religion with science. In addition to drugs, neurofeedback therapies that combine EEG scans with behavioristlike conditioning are making the workings of our brains more accessible for clinical adjustment.
Popular books offer "mind hacks"-neuroscientific tricks that one can try at home to improve cognitive performance. With the advent of such therapies that are able to transform the whole sensation of personhood through our brains, the salvific promise of religious authorities becomes renewed by laboratory researchers. In a recent study (Weisberg et al. forthcoming) , several groups of participants were presented with short explanations for psychological phenomena. For all but the group of professional psychologists, the explanations that included neurological data were rated as more compelling even though that data contributed nothing substantive to the actual explanation (a control group of experts confirmed this). The authors conclude that in the public's perception, the "seductive details" and state-of-the-art technology of neuroscience now bear an unduly greater performative power than the language of conventional psychology. If experiences like Alper's become more and more common through transformative therapies, so also will the explanatory authority granted to neuroscience continue to grow.
One of the earliest and most-cited attempts to turn brain science onto religion was cognitive neuroscientist Michael
Persinger's "God helmet" experiments in the 1980s at Laurentian University in Ontario. Widely published in scientific journals and a noted public speaker, he produced most of his research with funds from his private medical practice. In the early experiments, he modified a snowmobile helmet to direct electromagnetic fields at the brain's temporal lobes, which he and others surmised may be associated with religious experience (Persinger 1987 (Persinger , 2003 . The results of these tests were both astonishing and controversial.
Reportedly, 80 percent of the volunteers who donned the helmet had some kind of extraordinary experience, and of those, "most" sensed the presence of a personal being in the room. In the years since, these experiments have attracted public attention. Persinger's helmet has been effect. While some have taken this as evidence against Persinger's approach, he insists that the Swedish helmet was significantly different from his own.
The idea of a "God spot" (so-dubbed in the title of a 1997 Los Angeles Times article) that
Persinger pioneered caught the attention of a number of neuroscientists. V. S. Ramachandran, professor at the University of California, San Diego and bestselling author, has done experiments that reveal the religious proclivities of temporal lobe epileptics (1998), while Rhawn Joseph has argued in a series of flamboyant, self-published books (as well as an article in Zygon) for the centrality of the limbic system as the "transmitter to god" (Joseph 2001a (Joseph , 2001b (Joseph , 2003 . Joseph even suggests that these areas "contain neurons that fire selectively in response to visual images of faces, hands, eyes, and complex geometric shapes, including crosses" (2001:60). Together, Persinger, Ramachandran, and Joseph all tend to assume that experiences that look "religious"
should have their origin in a single brain center, giving the concept of religion its own neural correlate.
Probably the most influential neurotheologian today is Andrew Newberg at the University of Pennsylvania. Together with elder neuroscientist Eugene d'Aquili, he began devising experiments and writing preliminary theoretical articles for Zygon in the early 1990s.
Eventually their findings first appeared in a book, The Mystical Mind (d'Aquili and Newberg 2001), and then a scientific article two years later (Newberg et al. 2001b) , which Newberg has to date followed with three popular works about the research, each with plenty of spiritual musings (including Newberg et al. 2001a Newberg et al. , 2006 . All this reflects principally on a series of experiments he and his associates conducted, in which they examined meditating Tibetan Buddhist monks and praying Franciscan nuns with single emission computed tomography (SPECT) equipment (the latest book has added Pentacostals' glossolalia to the list). Not only did he detect clear differences between normal brain states and peak spiritual experiences, but there were major similarities across the different groups. On the one hand, regions associated with thinking and planning showed a noticeable increase in blood flow. On the other, the images revealed decreased activity in the posterior superior parietal lobes, which Newberg calls the "orientation association area." These, in the terms he uses for popular audiences, manage the distinction between "me and not-me" (Newberg 2001: 4-5) . Like Rhawn Joseph, Newberg also detected limbic system activity during peak experiences. However, he is less eager than Joseph or
Ramachandran to localize religiosity in any one specific brain region.
Persinger, Ramachandran, Joseph, and Newberg, as well as others, all look for neural correlates to religious experiences that appear to exist across cultures. Accompanying a Jamesian concept of religion that privileges such experiences, they take the work of science to be one of identification and explication. James, like these researchers, considered the belief content that is so critical to many cognitivists to be epiphenomenal. While both cognitivists and neurotheologians formulate religiosity as an object of study enmeshed in biology, they understand the locus of that object differently. As much as they owe to Humean and Jamesian approaches, the choice between them also depends crucially on scientific technologies unavailable to Hume or James. The neuroscientific equipment used to study experiences still has only marginal access to the content of a mind's beliefs, while the computer-cognitive model relies on day-to-day belief processes rather than peak extremes.
Meanwhile, the neurotheologians' findings demonstrate significant public appeal, having been featured in numerous major magazines articles and radio broadcasts. Such reports readily Anthropologist Barbara J. King, who has spent a career studying primates, has turned to religion directly in her popular-press book Evolving God: A Provocative View on the Origins of Religion (2007) . Pointing to evidence of ape cognition, empathy, social rules, and meaningmaking, then following it through a lineage of hominid archaeology, she suggests that "the fundamental building blocks of the religious imagination" can be found among animals (56). For her, the systems of emotional "belongingness" at work in ape societies are a "necessary condition" for religiosity in modern humans. The argument is more of an invitation for further research than a conclusive theory, and though on rather untrammeled ground, King is not entirely alone. A similar thrust is made in a small-press book by psychologist Jay Glass, . He attempts to demonstrate that, by coordinating group activity, religiosity has a "secular utility" which caused god genes to succeed in the course of human evolution. While the logic of group selection is controversial among biologists, Wilson's application of it to religion is compelling.
Coming to the study of religion from their scientific disciplines, many biologizers eagerly embrace older, nonscientific frameworks that resemble their own. Hamer joins most of the neurotheologians as a self-declared Jamesian, explicitly privileging the genetic bases of individual spiritual experience over the substrates of collective religious belief and practice. In contrast, Wilson and King cling to Durkheimian collectivity, constructing a concept of religiosity that depends on social forces. Meanwhile, they understand their science as offering an evolutionary theory that Durkheim and most of his followers never used. In these terms, both the cognitivists's beliefs and the neurotheologians' peak experiences become epiphenomenalsimply consequences of the fundamental evolutionary processes. 
Religionizing Biology
It is difficult to find anybody biologizing religion these days, especially in the popular press, who religion, especially if they are pursued with the rigor and self-critical care that some biologizers still lack. But that science of religion seems to offer at least as much to self-described religious imaginations as religiosity has to offer as an object of study for scientists.
Generative Ontologies
With the main orientations of recent biologizing laid out, it will be worthwhile to step back and see how they fit into broader patterns. Despite numerous attempts since the Enlightenment to establish clear demarcations between science and religion, experience and reflection show that the two have often been constructed in terms of each other. Ideas and social networks that people have formed under rubrics of either category share common worlds and common concerns even while the two discourses diverge. In particular, the ontologies-the theories of the real-that each has offered help to define (or define each against) the other.
The strong reading of Max Weber's "disenchantment of the world" ([1919] 1946) takes scientific enlightenment as a great steamroller rolling over religious enchantment by means of calculation, control, and scrupulous pursuit of the truth. Weber himself, of course, understood human religiosity in its many forms too well to draw such a conclusion, but others have been attracted to the steamroller's straightforwardness. A few decades earlier than Weber's pronouncements on disenchantment, John William Draper and Andrew Dickson White wrote important histories of the eternal "conflict" (Draper) and "warfare" (White) between science and religion. According to this model, explaining religion is the holy grail for the steamroller of science; once accounted for biologically, religious apologists will have no more ground on which to stand.
Meanwhile, others have insisted that the relationship between science and religion, understood rightly, is really a harmonious one. They point to Galileo's dictum that the Bible tells us how to go to heaven, not how the heavens go. Along these lines, nonbeliever and biologist
Stephen Jay Gould (1997) suggested a decade ago that science and religion can be understood as "non-overlapping magesteria," each with its own proper domain (one empirical, one moral) and never the twain shall meet. While the harmony model is popular especially among liberal theologians and scientists eager not to run into theological politics, it has done little to vanquish the conflict model's influence. Between the two models, however, in the twentieth century "religion and science" became an ongoing topic of academic and public conversation.
The necessary third approach, articulated by British historian John Hedley Brooke (1991) as the "complexity thesis," avoids the absurdities of both extremes. Brooke begins by arguing that neither "religion" nor "science" can be defined ahistorically and as a result, they hardly operate as entities stable enough to be either in conflict or in harmony. Instead, forms of religiosity have provided "presupposition, sanction, and motivation" for scientific research (42), just as they are capable of fostering public skepticism for scientific pronouncements. Religions have also gained symbolic currency from their association with scientific orthodoxy, just as they have from mutineering against it. To understand what seems to be happening to religion when it is biologized, the complexity thesis must be taken as the starting point. In the foregoing discussion, the interpretations and ultimate meanings that recent biologizers find in their research hardly fit into the neat dramas of conflict or harmony.
Complex Antecedents
In the United States, where most of today's biologizing takes place, recent historiography of religions helps to reveal some of the lineages out of which the contemporary complexity arises. In this context, Andrew Newberg's "Absolute Unitary Being" or Rhawn Joseph's alien astronaut theories both fit within a far older lineage of ideas drawing on both religious sources and scientific evidence. While some will (with cause) dismiss such extraordinary claims as bad science, we can at least recognize it as bad science with complex precedents.
Scientific Ontology and the Shape of Biologized Religiosity
This is an age in which we increasingly understand ourselves as biological beings. annual Templeton Prize promises a higher payout than the Nobel "for progress toward research or discoveries about spiritual realities," and it has typically been presented in regal form at Buckingham Palace. Templeton's is a significant performative achievement in its insistence that religious science and scientific religion are pursuits worthy enough to be bankrolled, and success in these fields deserves to be lauded at the highest level. 7
It is at the fringes of established religious traditions that the generative potential of biologized religiosity becomes most clear. The twentieth century saw the rise of a great many new religious movements directly inspired by science, and the trend continues. Just as Scientology draws from proto-Freudianism and New Agers from quantum physics, Rhawn
Joseph uses neuroscience to support his strange theories of human origins and the nature of true religion. As science has been used by metaphysical religions in the past, biologizing religion becomes an opportunity for departing from traditional dogmas in exchange for ideas that science seems to justify. In this way Andrew Newberg proclaims that real transcendence lies not in the beliefs that separate religions from each other but in the common experiences that unite them (Newberg et al. 2001: 162) . He sees the grounds of a new spirituality in scientific research like his, rather than in ancient scriptures or prophetic leaders. Resisting the exclusivity of conservative religions, he finds common cause with Dean Hamer's self-identification as 
Concluding Questions
There are, I have suggested, two processes going on at once. The study of religion, in some quarters, is being biologized, even as that biology is being religionized. As such, these processes (which are probably one) become part of a common, familiar problem of imagining religion as an object of academic study. Scholars of religion who aspire to biological methods will bring latent ideologies to their work, informing their frameworks, their observations, and their interpretations. For them, biologizing will not mean "breaking the spell," but for most comers, transforming it somewhat. Religiosity biologized appears alive and well. That being the case, let me propose some questions to carry with us as biologizing efforts progress.
Clearly, different religious sensibilities react to different kinds of scientific approaches.
While the Dalai Lama is eager to see brain scans of meditating monks, John Haught finds Pascal
Boyer's account of his belief in God threatening. For this reason, scholars of religion should be sensitive to the varied topography of these encounters, rather than rashly taking Haught's opinion as proof that religion (as a whole) cannot endure investigation by science (as a whole). Which other contexts rather than on secularized religious ones, perhaps researchers can avoid some ideological traps. Rather than enshrining a culturally-specific and contested term like "religion" in the biological vocabulary, they might avoid it altogether (along with "faith," "transcendence,"
"God," "spirituality," etc.) in exchange for ones that more closely fit the particular research techniques. Cognitivist jargon like "hyper-active agency detection device" may be a good start, though its specificity gets lost on audiences in a book with a title like Religion Explained. Would avoiding such terms (which subjects themselves may use) necessarily represent an unacceptable reductionism, or can it help inform, rather than simply replace, more discursive phenomena? 8 37
Finally, are biologizers developing conceptualizations of religious phenomena genuinely different from predecessors like Hume, James, and Durkheim? 9 It is already clear that people are using this research to explain and justify new ideas they deem spiritual or religious. In a world that becomes increasingly conversant with a biological anthropology, might people and institutions internalize specifically biological conceptions of religion, like distinguishing temporal lobe religion from lymbic system religion and assigning different ultimate value to each?
Biologizing, I mean to insist, is not simply a thing that happens to religiosity, or yet another means for explaining its existing mechanisms. Rather, the growing biological consciousness of modern society is being woven into existing religions, as well as creating new ones, and in so doing leaves a mark on the varieties of religious life. 
